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On explanation in linguistics

Esa Itkonen · 2014

Abstract

On explanation in linguistics1. Introductory RemarkThis paper purports to give an overview of the different ways that the term 'explanation' has been or is being used in the linguistic literature.It will be seen that in my opinion some of these uses are perfectly justified, others less so.As in all my previous publications, I have resisted here the utopian impulse which is all too common among the representatives of 'theoretical' linguistics: the present is thought to be full of promises that will be redeemed in the near future.As far as I can see, the reverse is true.If the present moment is experienced as less than satisfactory, it is so with respect to the past and not to the future.Is this view justified?Certainly no one who is ignorant of the history of linguistics has the competence to answer this question. Rational (= Purposive) ExplanationEver since Aristotle, the received view on human action (and action-explanation) is as follows.An action is performed in order to achieve a goal.The agent has a volitional or conative attitude towards a goal Y or, more simply, desires Y; and (s)he believes that an action X (which is at his/her disposal) is a means to achieve Y, i.e. that there exists a causal relation such that X is apt to bring about Y. (At this point it is irrelevant whether X is believed to be the only cause of this kind.)As a first approximation, it is this "volitional-epistemic complex" (G.H. von Wright) constituted by the goal-cum-belief, i.e.G & B, which brings about the action A; hence, (G & B) ⇨ A.This needs to be spelled out more explicitly.First, we have to distinguish between the (goal-entertaining) conative attitude G and its object Y; hence, G:Y.Second, we need to distinguish between the belief B and its object X  Y; hence, B:(X  Y), where the simple arrow  expresses ordinary causation.Third, we need to express the idea that "who wants the end wants the means": if one genuinely wants to achieve Y by means of X, then the conative attitude G is necessarily transferred from Y to X, as expressed by the entailment sign ⊢.Fourth, we must express the transition from the mental to the spatio-temporal: it is by means of mental causation, expressed by the double arrow, that the observable spatio-temporal action X is brought about by the mental antecedents, or representations, discussed up to now.In sum, we get the following schema of rational explanation (RE):and if all goes well, X  Y RE, qua explication of the logical structure of actions, has the general structure α ⇨ β.To begin with, whatever stands to the left of ⇨ may be characterized as mental, whereas whatever stands to its right qualifies as spatio-temporal.RE contains three relations or transitions of different types: (i) ordinary causation  (first as mentally represented, and then in the space-time); (ii) entailment ⊢; (iii) mental causation.